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Abstract: This article aims to analyse, from a historical-military context, the importance of Cyprus in the 
geopolitical world during the Cold War. Cyprus is a small island located in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, to 
the south of Turkey and west of Syria and Lebanon. Due to its strategic position between three continents, it 
was occupied by the Phoenicians, Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks and Romans in ancient times. 
During the Cold War, Cyprus was used as a support base for the actions of the great Occidental powers. The 
article is based on the author's experience, having worked as a Military Observer and Liaison Officer from 
September 2012 to July 2013 in Cyprus. It is also based on detailed literature reviews on this topic and 
official UN documents from the period. 
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Resumo: O objetivo do artigo é analisar, de um contexto histórico-militar, a importância do Chipre no 
mundo geopolítico durante a Guera Fria. Chipre é uma pequena ilha localizada no Mediterrâneo oriental, ao 
sul da Turquia e leste de Síria e Líbano. Por sua posição estratégica, entre três continentes ela foi ocupada 
por fenícios, egípcios, assírios, persas, gregos e romanos na Antiguidade. Durante a Guerra Fria, Chipre foi 
utilizado como base de apoio para as ações das grandes potências. O artigo é baseado na experiência do autor 
como Observador Militar e Oficial de Ligação entre 2012 e 2013, no Chipre,  em uma revisão bibliográfica 
detalhada sobre o tópico e em análises documentais e documentos oficiais da ONU referentes ao período.  
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Initial considerations 
Cyprus is a small island in the Northeast of the Mediterranean Sea, having joined the European 
Union in 2004. With a total size of 9251 km
2
, it is located 100 km West of Syria, 60 km South of 
Turkey and about 320 km East of the Greek island of Rhodes. It is 227 km long and 95 km wide. 
Due to the important strategic location of the island, Cyprus has been part of every empire that 
controlled the Middle East – Assyria, Persian, Alexander, the Great’s Empire, Roman, Byzantine, 
Venetian, Ottoman and British, spending much of its existence under the dominion of world powers 
(KOREMENOS, 2006).  
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During the Cold War, Cyprus was used as a support base for the actions of the great powers: 
Britain and the United States (US). The island was vital to the British State, which needed the oil 
from the Middle East for its reconstruction, as they were losing all of their colonies after the Second 
World War. The United States had the island as the best place to carry out the monitoring of 
missiles in the Soviet Union, being able to detect a nuclear missile at the time of launching 
(MANKOFF, 2012, p. 33). 
Looking from a historical-military context, the aim of this article is to analyse the 
importance of Cyprus in the geopolitical world during the Cold War, highlighting the existence of 
ethnic groups in-fighting. It is based on the author's experience while working as a Military 
Observer and Liaison Officer from September 2012 to July 2013 in UNFICYP. It is also based on 
detailed literature reviews on this topic and official UN documents from the period. 
 
1. Cyprus’ History 
1.1 Foreign domination in Cyprus 
The island was occupied, in 1571, by the Ottoman Turkish Empire, which remained in its 
possession for three Centuries, bringing the Turkish minority and laying the foundation for future 
problems in the island. Being aware of their weaknesses and in an attempt to obtain protection 
against a possible Russian invasion, the Ottomans left Cyprus to Britain on June 4th, 1878 during 
the Berlin Congress (TOCCI & KOVZIRIDZE, 2004). 
British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli believed that Britain had acquired a place from 
which the interests of Britain could be secured. However, Cyprus became overshadowed by the 
acquisition of Egypt, which provided the British Empire with far superior military bases. The island 
became useless and of no interest to them. 
After 1878, the leaders of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus – who were also the most 
powerful socio-political and economic force in the island – recognised the British State, their new 
colonial masters, as allies in their quest for Enosis, movement of the Greek-Cypriot population to 
incorporate the island of Cyprus to Greece. The desire that grew within the Greek Cypriot 
community was a direct result of the 'awareness of belonging to Greek culture and civilisation' 
(HOLLAND, 1998, p. 35), which was kept alive by the Church over three hundred and seven years 
of Ottoman rule in the country. The belief that Great Britain would be sympathetic to the desire of 
Cyprus to join their mother country was linked to the fact that the British supported the Greek 
independence in the early nineteenth century. 
Britain offered Cyprus to Greece in 1915 with the condition that they would become their 
ally during the First World War. King Constantine, believing in a possible German victory, rejected 
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the offer (STORRS, 1943). Eight years later, in Article 20 of the Lausanne Treaty, the newly 
founded Republic of Turkey renounced any claim to sovereignty over Cyprus in favour of Britain 
and two years later the island was declared a British crown colony. Cyprus was inactive for several 
years and had little military use during the Second World War. 
The confrontation with the colonial regime was initiated by EOKA (Ethniki Organosis 
Kyprion Agoniston), a Greek Cypriot guerrilla organisation led by General George Grivas. At the 
end of 1950, Britain adjusted its imperialist policy and agreed to the independence of the island. 
The Greek Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios III, accepted the independence, instead of the 
hoped for Enosis. Mother countries, Greece and Turkey, were involved diplomatically with the 
creation of a constitution for the now independent Republic of Cyprus (TOCCI & KOVZIRIDZE, 
2004). 
 
1.2 The independence and division of the two communities 
The 1960 Constitution was an extremely complicated agreement that failed to unite the government 
and its people in a united Cypriot nationality. Instead, its elements reinforced the separation of the 
Greek and Turkish communities. The bicameral structure of the presidential and legislative powers 
helped accentuate the cultural divisions, setting policies, positions and representations as either 
Turkish Cypriot or Greek Cypriot (COUFOUDAKIS, 2006). Turkish Cypriots wanted to be 
recognised as an equal entity next to the Greek Cypriot majority, demanding a corresponding. In 
order to meet these Constitutional requirements, a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot 
Vice-President, with the right to veto, were appointed.   
In addition, the agreement dictated that the Turkish Cypriots had 30% of all positions in the 
public service and 40% of the Army. These percentages, however, did not reflect the demographic 
percentage of Cyprus (LINDLEY, 2007). At the time of independence, in 1960, the Turkish 
Cypriots consisted of only 20% of the population, while the Greek Cypriots were 80% of the 
population (TOCCI & KOVZIRIDZE, 2004). The Constitution was therefore designed for the 
safety of ethnic group’s rights rather than individual rights of Cypriots and thus established a 
constitution prone to deadlocks (LINDLEY, 2007, p. 224). 
An important element about the 1960 Constitution involves three important treaties attached 
to the Agreement: The Treaties of Establishment, Alliance and Guarantee. The Treaty of 
Establishment created the British Sovereign Bases (SBA), Episkopi and Dhekelia, which were areas 
that would remain under British control. The Guarantee Treaty was intended to 'guarantee the 
independence, territorial integrity and security' of the Republic of Cyprus and prevent the two 
communities from reaching Enosis and Taksim. The Taksim believed that partition was the only 
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way to ensure that Cyprus would always have a Turkish presence and to prevent assimilation or 
alleged ethnic cleansing of the Turkish population of the island, due to its population of Greek 
majority. The key part of this Treaty is Article 4, which states that: 'Each of the three powers are 
guaranteed the right to take action with the sole purpose of restoring the state of affairs created by 
this Treaty’ (CARMENT, 2006, p. 49). This became critical in 1974, when Turkey used this article 
to legitimise its military intervention and use of force. The Treaty of Alliance was conceived as a 
defence agreement to maintain peace and security on the island, allowing the presence of Greek, 
Turkish and British troops. 
The 1960 Constitution brought an end to the anti-colonial struggle, but did not bring a 
permanent peace to the island. President Makarios was the archbishop and primate of the 
autocephalous Church of Cyprus, a Greek Orthodox Church (1950–1977), and the first President of 
the Republic of Cyprus (1960–1974 and 1974–1977). Greek Cypriots were unhappy with the 
independence agreement since it was externally imposed and was considered a betrayal of the 
Enosis cause, making too generous concessions for the Turkish Cypriots
 
(TOCCI & KOVZIRIDZE, 
2004, p. 68). 
Turkish Cypriots, led by Vice-President Fazil Kutchuk (1959-1973), were also unhappy 
with the final agreement and remained concerned about the safety of the existence of their 
community and their political rights. This dissatisfaction and the structure of the Constitution 
reinforced the division between the two groups. As a result, the conflict between Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots continued at a political level with the two communities struggling to create its own police 
force, army and public service. In addition, these two communities did not agree with the tax 
division, the limits of the municipality of the Turkish language, or the process of making laws in the 
legislature (O’MALLEY & CRAIG, 1999). 
Makarios began a campaign to build international support for changes to the Cypriot 
Constitution through visits to non-aligned and Soviet countries. He also invested in the internal 
support of the Communist Party of Cyprus, AKEL, which gained strength in rural areas of the 
country. With these movements, the US concerns about the Soviet influence in the eastern 
Mediterranean increased. 
On November 30th, 1963, Makarios revealed his proposal to amend the constitution. There 
would be thirteen points to be changed in the Cypriot Constitution, based on the actual percentage 
of the population division. Changes included controversial revisions in the armed forces, police and 
public services; veto removal power of the President and Vice President; and abolition of Turkish 
municipalities. Turkey, speaking on behalf of the Turkish-Cypriots, rejected the proposals and 
tensions soared across the island (O’MALLEY & CRAIG, 1999). The Turkish Cypriots left the 
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government in protest and were grouped in enclaves. On January 1st, 1964, Makarios said that the 
treaties of Alliance and Guarantee were no longer valid (JAMES, 2002, p. 68). 
 
1.3 Increased crisis 
In early February 1963, the situation on the island had deteriorated and clashes between 
communities increased in intensity. At this time, US people and the British people began to discuss 
and support the Turkish attempts to separate the two communities (O’MALLEY & CRAIG, 1999, 
p. 94). US Secretary of State George Ball (1961-1966) and other Washington officials came up with 
a contingency plan that would 'allow Turkey to invade Cyprus and occupy a large area in the 
northern part of the island ... to protect the Turkish Cypriots’. This invasion would be carefully 
controlled, based on the Treaty of Guarantee, which is consistent with the right of Turkey to protect 
their community.  
Similarly, the contingency plan would seek to convince Makarios to accept a Peacekeeping 
Force in Cyprus, made up of troops from the United States and Britain, which would protect the 
lives of the Turkish minority and avoid an armed confrontation with Greece. In early March 
(MALLINSON, 2005), the UN agreed to create a UN Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP) 'to preserve 
peace and international security' that should ‘use its best efforts to avoid the fight and contribute to 
the maintenance of law and order in an attempt to return the island to normal conditions’ (UNSC, 
1964). After some important negotiations, the force was made up of British (2750), Canadians 
(1000), Finnish (1000), Swedish (1000), and Danish (1,000) troops. This mediation was sponsored 
by the United Nations and was be led by Dr. Galo Plaza, former President of Ecuador (JAMES, 
2002).  
Tensions between the communities continued throughout the Spring, despite the presence of 
UNFICYP. On June 1st, 1964, Makarios declared that all Greek Cypriots between the ages of 
eighteen and fifty were summoned to compulsory military service in order to create a new National 
Guard. Turkey responded with preparations for a large-scale invasion of Cyprus. On June 5th, 
however, the US President Lyndon Johnson sent the Turkish leader Ismet Inonu a 'brutal' note 
stating: “I hope you understand that if Turkey takes a step that results in a Soviet intervention, 
without the full consent and understanding of allies, NATO members may have to consider the 
obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union” 
 The letter persuaded Inonu to wait for 24 hours before starting an intervention plan. During 
this break, agreements were made to start talks between the Greeks and the Turks without the 
participation of Makarios. The crisis had been averted. Negotiations began between Greeks and 
Turks, but it was impossible to reach a consensus because of their polarised positions. To make it 
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worse, in early August, the Greek Cypriot National Guard attacked Turkish Cypriot positions and 
the island erupted into chaos again. Dean Acheson (1949-1963), US Secretary of State, was 
frustrated with the lack of agreement and tried to use NATO forces to put pressure on Greece and 
Turkey. If this tactic failed, the US insisted that the struggle should be confined to the island, not 
involving American weapons, and not allowing Greece and Turkey to use the violence against each 
other (STERN, 1977). 
The American contingency plan was described as a fait accompli and as the only possible 
way to achieve peace, a statement made in a general meeting with President Johnson (1963-1969) 
right before the National Security Council meeting on August 19
th
. They argued that the plan was 
not used in 1964 because of ‘concerns about the dangerous turn of events in Vietnam’ (BALL, 
1982). Thus, the discussion of the 1964 crisis ends with the ominous statement that 'secret plans for 
dividing Cyprus between Greece and Turkey, by force, if necessary, were left on the shelf for now' 
(O’MALLEY & CRAIG, 1999, p. 119). 
Between 1965 and 1966, Cyprus experienced a period of ‘unstable peace' with the 
intercommunal negotiations slowly progressing. Turkish Cypriots continued to operate their own 
administration outside the internationally recognised government of Cyprus. The two communities 
were completely divided and the Green Line, line that divided the two communities in the city of 
Nicosia, of UNFICYP was porous, where intercommunal incidents could easily increase 
(CALAME, 2011, p.133). 
The political situation on the island worsened with the military coup in Greece on April 
21st, 1967. George Papadopoulos (1967-1974), a far-right activist, took over the Greek government, 
developing an aggressive and nationalist stance regarding Cyprus. The situation of the island 
intensified again after the Greek Cypriot forces, led by George Grivas, launched attacks on two 
Turkish Cypriot villages, Ayios Theodoros and Kofinou in November 1967. With the incident, 
Turkey, once again, mobilised forces to intervene. The US sent Cyrus Vance, US Deputy Secretary 
of Defence, on a diplomatic mission to convince Turkey to retreat and to avoid war within NATO. 
Turkey demanded the withdrawal of all Greek forces above the limits set by the Treaty of Alliance, 
which totalled 10,000 soldiers, as well as the removal of Grivas. Greece agreed and the crisis was 
averted, at least for the moment. 
In January 1966, Secretary Rusk reinforced the United States recommendation that 'at this 
time, the resumption of the UN active mediation is necessary’ (O’MALLEY & CRAIG, 1999). 
Thus, the US believed that the UN should be the main mediator and Enosis would not be a valid 
option. Turkey, however, did not agree with this assessment and the new Turkish Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Caglayangil, demanded a more meaningful US involvement. The Department, 
Revista de Estudos Internacionais (REI), ISSN 2236-4811, Vol. 8 (1), 2017 
 
123 
 
however, responded with a message refusing to endorse significant US involvement. Ball (MoC, 
1966) said:  
The US government sympathises with those who suffer difficulties as a result of 
changing conditions on the island,’ and, 'The US is following closely and 
encouraging the UN General Secretary’s representative, Ambassador Bernardes, in 
his efforts to improve the conditions on the island. 
 
The negotiations failed to achieve their aims and violence erupted again in November 1967. On 
November 17th, President Johnson sent a message to Archbishop Makarios appealing to 'do 
everything within the power of his government to reduce the threat against peace that is hovering on 
the region.' He also sent a similar message to Caglayangil, who replied in the following way:  
 
At that time I expected a different message from a country with which we have a 
common destiny ... I expected that, given this situation, our American friends 
would come and say that they regret having prevented a Turkish initiative and 
would say 'Now the decision is yours.' (DoS, 1967). 
 
Johnson's message did not meet Turkish expectations. The Turks demanded the immediate 
withdrawal of all Greek troops and the US sent the Secretary of Defence, Cyrus Vance, to negotiate 
a ceasefire starting November 23
rd
. Rusk, however, sent a telegram to all ambassadors involved 
stating his concern about friction among NATO members, which stated: 'We do not need to 
apologize to any governments because of our pressure to maintain peace. Our responsibility is to 
ensure US national interests’ (DoS, 1967).  
Husky made it clear that the stability and the prevention of war between the NATO allies 
was the ultimate goal. Cyrus Vance was able to achieve a cease-fire which involved the removal of 
all Greek troops from Cyprus. The State Department praised Vance for his efforts and stated that 
'without your activity, Turkey would now be at war with Greece.’  
The crisis was averted and the ceasefire maintained. In January 1968, the US began to 
discuss their strategy for Cyprus again. Rusk (1968) recommended that the US provided 'strong 
support for the mediation of the United Nations [...] a long-term solution’.  In the light of these 
American recommendations, the proposal was presented to a conference between Greece, Turkey, 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriot representatives. The conference would try to discuss a 
workable constitution for Cyprus. 
 
1.4 The calm before the big crisis  
Richard Nixon (1969-1974), the new US president in 1968, was a fervent anti-communist. He 
normalised relations with the Greeks and restored military aid to the country. The president and 
Henry Kissinger (1968-1976), Secretary of State, wanted the removal of Makarios, the Cypriot 
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President, because to his proximity to the non-aligned countries and the Soviets (O’MALLEY & 
CRAIG, 1999 p.132). 
This period is also notable for the number of attacks against Makarios. The first incident was 
an attack on his personal helicopter in March 1970, which Stern and Hitchens believed that had the 
participation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (STERN, 1977, p.71). The Archbishop was 
able to escape unharmed. In 1972, a group of bishops of the Greek Orthodox Church demanded the 
resignation of Makarios since it conflicted with his ecclesiastical functions. Two more attempts 
were made that year. The first was organised by General George Grivas, while the second was a 
landmine explosion just before his car drove by. These assassination attempts were credited to the 
Greek Union, by its officers in the Greek Cypriot National Guard. 
A month later, in June 1971, Makarios made an eight-day visit to the Soviet Union to gain 
even more support for the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus. Meanwhile, General 
Grivas returned to Cyprus, possibly with the support of the Greek Union and began to reorganise 
the EOKA forces in a new group called EOKA-B. US concerns about communist influence on 
Cyprus were already strong, but reached its peak in early 1972, when Makarios acquired a 
significant amount of Czechoslovakian weapons for its police force (HITCHENS, 2002). 
O'Malley and Craig (1999) argue that the British State was not cooperating with the US on 
its facilities, particularly during the Yom Kippur War. In fact, the British supposedly denied the use 
of the airfield at Akrotiri by the US, in order to support the Israelis. In addition, O’Malley and Craig 
(1999) argue that the British wanted to remove all military forces from Cyprus until July 1974, 
based on the information acquired from a political adviser of the Foreign Secretary: ‘Americans 
could not be sure that Great Britain would let them use the facilities of Cyprus when they most 
needed.' This allegedly contributed to the US concerns about its strategic interests in Cyprus and 
convinced them of the need for a military coup in Greece as well as a Turkish invasion of the island 
to ensure their interests (HITCHENS, 2002). 
 
1.5 The year of 1974 - The Turkish invasion 
The tumultuous year of 1974 began with the death of the legendary EOKA and EOKA-B leader, 
George Grivas. To further complicate the situation, relations between Turkey and Greece worsened 
due to problems with oil exploitation rights and territorial control of the Aegean islands. After the 
series of assassination attempts, on July 1st, Makarios tried to reduce the participation of Greece in 
the size of the National Guard. The next day, he sent an open letter to the powerless Greek President 
Phaedon Ghizikis, stating, 'once again I felt ... the invisible hand, extended from Athens, seeking to 
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destroy my human existence.' Makarios demanded the withdrawal of all Athenian officers in the 
National Guard (DENKTASH, 1982). 
On July 15th, the palace of Makarios, in Nicosia, was attacked by the National Guard. The 
president was declared dead and a new government was established led by Nicos Sampson. In 
reality, Makarios had escaped to Paphos, being taken to the SBA in Akrotiri. The Royal Air Force 
(RAF) took him off the island and flew him to London. Meanwhile, the fighting between forces 
loyal to Makarios and the National Guard spread across the island. The Turkish Cypriots 
immediately worried about the security of their community and asked the Turkish support. They 
responded by sending their leader Bülent Ecevit to London to suggest a combined military answer. 
The British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, refused and asked for tripartite talks as he sent a British 
task force to Cyprus. Kissinger sent Joseph Sisco on July 18th as his representative to negotiate 
between the Greeks and Turkish in an attempt to avoid war within NATO (DENKTASH, 1982). 
Turkey invaded the port city of Kyrenia on July 20th, 1974, and took over the road that 
connected Kyrenia and Nicosia, which allowed them to connect with the Turkish Cypriot enclave in 
the capital. Atrocities were reported by both sides and the fighting spread throughout the island. At 
this time, a British task force arrived in Cyprus just to protect their bases and civilians, but not to 
prevent Turkish military action. The Cyprus crisis had come to a violent climax. 
The US took the lead in diplomatic efforts to avoid war. However, O'Malley and Craig 
(1999) argue that the ceasefire organised by Kissinger prevented the Turkish military from 
occupying more than just a small portion of the island actually helped them to strengthen their 
position on the island before starting the second half of the invasion plan. According to Turkish 
writer Mehmet Ali Birand, Turkish forces had full control over Kyrenia and a passage that 
connected directly to the Turkish Cypriot quarters of Nicosia (BIRAND, 1985). 
On July 23rd, 1974, Nicos Sampson resigned his position as president of Cyprus and 
Glafkos Clerides took his place. Clashes continued in Nicosia along the 'Green Line' established by 
the UN that divided the two communities. Regardless of the conflict, negotiations between Greek, 
Turkish and British States began on July 25th. The US sent the State Secretary Deputy for 
International Affairs, William Buffum, as the personal representative of Kissinger. O'Malley  and 
Craig (1999) criticise Buffum and Kissinger for his 'extraordinary failure to criticise the Turkish 
action' (O’MALLEY & CRAIG, 1999, p. 201). Negotiations continuously failed. Kissinger, through 
long-distance calls, managed to intermediate an agreement that called for the withdrawal of Turkish 
troops, a standstill in the fight and the creation of a United Nations buffer zone. 
The second round of negotiations was scheduled again for early August. Tensions continued 
due to the continuous movement of Turkish troops and Makarios, even in exile, did not accept any 
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division of the island. Meanwhile, Nixon resigned on August 9th to avoid impeachment over the 
Watergate scandal that was happening in the United States and Gerald R. Ford became president. 
Kissinger remained with the new administration and this time sent Arthur Hartman Geneva as his 
representative and as a US observer (O’MALLEY & CRAIG, 1999, p. 201). 
Negotiations did not advance because of frequent demands from the Turkish Foreign 
Minister, Turan Gunesh (1977), for an immediate agreement, based on a possible partition and 
rumours of Turkish plans for a second invasion. O'Malley and Craig (1999) argue that Kissinger 
denied the likelihood of a second invasion and 'made it clear that the United States was satisfied 
with guarantees from Ecevit of military restraint’ (HITCHENS, 2002, p. 97). The US prevented the 
British from moving militarily and prevented Turkish military control over the territory. 
Despite the negotiations, the Turkish plans to divide the island continued. Talks collapsed 
on August 13th and 14th when the Turkish forces began to move. O’Malley and Craig (1999) argue 
that Kissinger aggravated the situation when he said 'the position of the Turkish community in 
Cyprus requires considerable improvement and protection. We support a greater degree of 
autonomy for them’ (KYLE, 1983, p.83). 
Ultimately, Greece had no strength to counter the Turkish operation. The Turks continued to 
advance to occupy almost 1/3 of the island, covering all its northern part. According to O'Malley 
and Craig (1999), the US influenced the Turkish troops movement to up to a certain area, showing 
how much the US was able to help and support the movement of Turkish troops. They also state 
that the collapse of the negotiations happened because of Kissinger's support on Turkish goals and 
his refusal to further dissuade the British military on the island. The 1964 Plan developed by 
Acheson was achieved, through Kissinger's actions in 1974, reaching the desired partition of the 
island and protection for installations and US interests on the island. 
 
2. The strategic importance of Cyprus during the Cold War 
2.1 Acheson Plan 
Before detailing the importance of Cyprus during the Cold War, it is important to discuss the Plan 
in which the US sought to assert their interests, called the Acheson Plan. On June 19th, the CIA 
concluded that, due to the mutual hostility between the two Cypriot communities, a solution based 
on cooperation between them should be excluded. This left the partition of the island or the 
annexation to Greece (compensating Turkey with a military base), as the only two possibilities that 
could be imposed to the Cypriots with the support of Greece and Turkey (DoS, 1967).  
Fundamentally, CIA added that both solutions should ensure the maintenance of British 
bases and US facilities on the island. A previous CIA report expressed concerns about the security 
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of US facilities in Cyprus, which included the checkpoint for communications with the Middle East 
CIA, operating under the guise of a radio relay station of the Department of State.  
Some historians, as Nicolet (2001), support the belief that the US favoured partition as a 
solution. The historian Claude Nicolet (2001) states that the main idea was that the island would 
have been divided in 1960 between the Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom (NICOLET, 
2001, p. 293). For geopolitical reasons, Washington valued its alliance with Ankara and saw the 
Turkish Cypriots as victims, which meant that some kind of compromise had to be made to Turkey. 
Based on these considerations, Dean Acheson (1949-1953), former US Secretary of State 
and author of the Truman Doctrine, formulated various ‘solutions’ to the crisis in Cyprus that, 
amongst other things, ensured the political neutralisation of Makarios and 
[b]y dividing the island between the Greek and Turkish, non-aligned and possible 
communist influences would be removed from there and thus from entering the 
NATO sphere. Britain would keep its bases and the US communication stations 
(NARA, 1964). 
 
Washington’s mindset had dramatically changed. The US believed that the worst scenario would be 
a unitary state, as it would mean Makarios achieving a state supported by Russia and Egypt, that 
would quickly fall under the influence of the already powerful Communist Party of Cyprus. 
Acheson was careful to not produce concrete plans in written form, leaving room for some 
deliberately ambiguous questions. Consequently, it is impossible to define precisely what his real 
intentions were. Essentially, however, the Acheson plans were based on the premise that most of the 
island would be joined with Greece, giving Turkey a military base. Negotiations collapsed when the 
essence of the first Acheson Plan was published by the Greek newspaper Vima, stating that Athens 
intended to reject the plan that eventually ended up also being rejected by Turkey. 
Meanwhile, the intercommunal violence erupted on the island, when the Greek Cypriot 
forces attacked the Turkish-Cypriot community area of Kokkina and Mansoura, in the north-
western part of the island. A few days later, the Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyprianou informed the 
US Embassy in Cyprus that, because of another Turkish threat, Nicosia had requested aid from 
Moscow. 
In early 1964, US policy-makers had developed a similar plan in which Turkey would be 
allowed to invade the Karpas peninsula to trigger a Greek response, resulting in an Enosis with 
concessions to Turkey. The Plan was only to be used if Ankara did not give up using military force. 
Once it became clear that Turkey would take military measures, the US ambassador to Turkey 
informed the Turkish president that he could pursue a 'movement carefully controlled' rather than a 
military invasion on a large scale. The reasons for this would be to avoid a Greek retaliation, 
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avoiding a war within NATO and to convince international opinion that Turkey had invoked their 
rights under the Guarantee Treaty. 
Washington tried to delay the Turks for as long as possible. Since they could no longer 
delay a Turkish military operation, Ankara would have to be informed of the predetermined areas 
that they could invade in order to avoid conflict with the Greeks. It has been suggested that Turkey 
should '[...] land in Kyrenia, keeping a line connecting Lefka and the northern half of the walled city 
of Nicosia’. 
It was reported to the British Embassy in Washington that President Johnson believed that, 
based on past events in Cuba, Russian technicians were about to install bases of surface-to-air 
missiles in Cyprus. Acheson recommended that Washington should stop trying to promote Greek-
Turkish agreement in Cyprus and focus US policy to prevent the island from becoming another 
Cuba. Many in Washington believed that Makarios would be the 'Castro of the Mediterranean'. 
 
2.2 Cyprus and its importance during the Cold War 
Being close to Africa, Europe, Asia and to the main navigation axes of the Mediterranean made 
Cyprus a strategically well positioned island and, thus, highly valuable during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. With the end of the Second World War and early Cold War, the importance of 
the island became more evident looking from a global perspective. In this period, oil became very 
important to Western Europe and to the US, making them dependent on this primarily Middle 
Eastern product. Britain, financially shaken, needed oil for the country's reconstruction and 
maintenance of its national interests (MANKOFF, 2012). 
British troops left Palestine and the crisis in the Suez Canal, in 1948, when Cyprus became 
the new British Headquarters in the Middle East, making it strategically vital to British interests. In 
addition, there was a very real threat of a communist takeover in Greece and the possibility of a 
Soviet invasion of Cyprus has further increased the importance of the island (O’MALLEY & 
CRAIG, 1999, p.140-141). 
As already mentioned, the strategic importance of the island to Britain grew with time until 
Cyprus became a key player for the British Foreign Policy in the Middle East, influenced by the 
British interest 'in the Middle East's commercial routes and the commitments of the Commonwealth 
in the Suez Canal' (STEPHENS, 1966, p. 3). During this period, the British economy was in decline 
and the reduction of military presence around the world, by the orders of Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson (1964-1970), angered American leaders. This included the announcement, in 1966, that 
Britain was reducing its forces in Cyprus, Malta, Guyana and other areas of Southeast Asia, such as 
Singapore and Malaysia (O’MALLEY & CRAIG, 1999 p. 123-4). 
Revista de Estudos Internacionais (REI), ISSN 2236-4811, Vol. 8 (1), 2017 
 
129 
 
According to O'Malley and Craig (1999), this 'marked the beginning of the end of Britain’s 
role as a military power in the world and warned Americans to the prospect that one day they could 
lose the use of Cyprus based facilities’ (FOLEY, 1964, p. 87). The US concern was compounded by 
the new Middle East crisis, which included the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Nasser and the 
Arab-Israeli Six Day War. The authors argue that the loss of the Canal and the Middle Eastern oil 
led to an increase in the British economic crisis and a cut of more than 150,000 militaries and 
civilians, which again infuriated the Americans (O’MALLEY & CRAIG, 1999, p. 124). 
Being a major military power in the post-war period, the US had major concerns about the 
future of the island. Makarios’ association with the Soviets led to a concern of a communist 
takeover on the island due to the British weakening in the region. Americans did not want a new 
Cuba in one of the most complex areas of the world. 
These concerns were motivated by the island's value as a military and intelligence base in 
the eastern Mediterranean. The US maintained communications facilities on the island, being 
valuable sources of intelligence during the Cold War. In addition, Britain held, within the nuclear 
deterrent, as part of the commitment of CENTO
2
, four squadrons of medium bombers on the island. 
Cyprus was crucial to support them and the effective use of air routes. Without Cyprus, the British 
would have had great difficulty in enhancing air routes and would lose the ability to strengthen the 
Suez Canal, becoming vulnerable to political constraints. 
The fact that Greece and Turkey had become NATO members made the situation more 
complicated. Cyprus became of interest to the US in this strategically important part of the world. 
The reality of the Cypriot communities acquired secondary importance due to the geopolitical 
interests of Britain and the United States. They could not conceive that any conflict between Greece 
and Turkey would weaken the southwest flank of NATO. 
An agreement was reached, in 1968, allowing the US to use communications facilities on 
the island. They claim that CIA was also allowed to establish their own radio monitors in the SBA 
and to build antennas for the US intelligence agencies network. In Cyprus, there were surveillance 
and intelligence facilities that contributed to the US and NATO's assessments, helping to reduce 
Russia’s Navy and Air Force’s freedom of action. The importance of the facilities was so big that it 
needed the SBA for their protection. O'Malley and Craig (1999) argue that the US had abandoned 
                                               
2
 The Organization of the Central Treaty (Central Treaty Organization), also known as the Baghdad Pact, a military 
alliance was founded in 1955 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom, and scrapped in 1976. It had 
intended to avoid a Soviet expansion based on Keenan Containment Policy and the Theories of fimbriae Spykman. 
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the concept of Independence Guaranteed for a united Cyprus and accepted the fact that, at any time 
later, Turkey could be allowed to occupy part of the island. The US had clear goals for the island: 
 
A politically stable Cyprus, linking Greece, Turkey and the UK, in a relationship of 
cooperation, willing to and being able to resist Communist subversion and 
continuing to be available to the West of the British military installations in Cyprus  
  
The maintenance of unimpeded communication media was of vital importance to the US, that 
operated four communication centres, one in their own American Embassy, two on each side of 
Nicosia, at Yerolakkos and Mia Milea, and the Broadcast Information Service that housed the main 
CIA’s listening post in the Middle East, on the North coast of Cyprus. 
 
Final considerations 
After the occupation of Turkey, in 1974, the southern part of the island remained under Greek 
Cypriot control, it is recognised internationally as the Republic of Cyprus. Around 20,000 Greek 
Cypriots left the area under Turkish control, which is equivalent to 40% of the island in the North, 
and about 50,000 Turkish Cypriots left the South to take asylum in this area. From the mid-1980s, 
talks about reunification started, although they have never been successful. 
More than 50 years after the invasion of the island, talks for reunification continued. In 
November 1983, Turks unilaterally proclaimed ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, in the area 
they had occupied in 1974. This ‘new’ country is not recognised by the international community 
and is considered invalid by the UN Security Council. 
Since 2001, the heads of the communities reached an agreement on restarting peace 
conversations. In April 2004, there was a referendum on a plan presented by the UN for 
reunification of the island (Annan Plan). The proposal was rejected by 75.8% of the Greek Cypriots 
because they felt that the plan arbitrarily incorporated many demands of Turkey. The plan was not 
balanced and did not meet their main concerns about security, operation and viability of the 
solution. 
After the elections on March 21st, 2008, New Greek Cypriot president, Dimitris Christofias 
(2008-2013), and Turkish Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat (2005-2010), agreed to start 
negotiations and decided to open a point of communication between the two parties in Ledra Street 
in central Nicosia, the capital. 
On May 1st 2004, the Republic of Cyprus became a full member of the European Union 
(EU). The adhesion to the EU was a natural choice for Cyprus, dictated not only by its culture, 
civilisation and history, but also for its European outlook and support to the ideals of democracy, 
freedom and justice. European Union Law and regulations applications are suspended in the area 
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under Turkish military occupation, pending on the solution of the problem of the island's division. 
However, the Cypriot government, in cooperation with the European Union, has been promoting 
arrangements to facilitate economic transactions between the two communities and to improve 
Turkish Cypriots’ lifestyle. 
Even after the end of the Cold War, Cyprus has not lost its strategic importance within 
global geopolitics. The United States and Britain continue to use its strategic location as a base to 
support their actions in the Middle East. Air surveillance, refuelling missions and air strikes in the 
Gulf War of 1990, in the Libyan War of 2011 and, more recently, in the war against ISIS in Syria, 
had its starting point Cyprus. The SBAs are being used to transmit intelligence to the Syrian rebels 
using AWACS aircraft. 
Russia has sought bilateral agreements with Cyprus in order to militarily use, the ports and 
airports in the island. In early 2015, Russia and Cyprus announced the signing of ten agreements on 
cooperation programs in science, education, scientific studies and technologies, along with 
cooperation programs to combat drug trafficking and terrorism. There were also two military 
cooperation agreements for defence and naval operations, which caused a public complaint by the 
US and British States. Russia wanted access to a Mediterranean port and a nearby presence to the 
British Bases (MANKOFF, 2012, p. 33). 
It’s important to remember that Turkey wants to join the European Union. The occupation 
of part of Cyprus by the Turks has a direct impact on their access to the EU, bringing more attention 
to the situation of the island. The dispute over Cyprus has made the EU freeze the talks, and that no 
chapter can be closed until a resolution has been found.  
The European Commission refuses to start negotiations for Turkey's adhesion to the EU, 
citing, among other things, that the conflict with Cyprus should be the first problem to be resolved 
before starting negotiations. This is a serious problem and a difficult one to solve, but the solution is 
a requirement for the process of Turkish accession to the EEC to take place. In the words of Jack 
Straw, former British Foreign Minister, it is impossible to not recognise another member within the 
European Union, leaving limited options for the Turks (UK, 2004). Also, the Cypriot Government 
threatens to veto any talks and Turkish requests to the EU if they do not officially recognise the 
Republic of Cyprus. 
Another factor that increases the importance of Cyprus in the post-Cold War period is the 
confirmation of existing large gas fields in its territorial waters, opening the door to self-sufficient 
energy and possibly becoming a supplier for the European Union. In this respect, the Cypriot 
government, which signed an agreement, in 2010, with Israel, to establish the demarcation of the 
maritime boundary and exclusive economic zones of both States, does not exclude the possibility of 
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collaborating in the energy sector with the neighbouring country. Turkey does not recognise the 
Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus because of the island's partition, and it opposes any 
negotiation on natural gas found while the situation of the island remains undefined, threatening to 
send warships to Cyprus if they continue navigating in the area. Finally, this small, yet 
internationally coveted island has become a regional business Centre of increasing importance and 
an international Centre of communications and transportation. 
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